## For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITE	D STATES	DISTRICT	COURT

## FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

No. C 11-3129 SBA (PR) JAMES EVANS, JR., ORDER DENYING MOTION TO BAR Petitioner, TORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE FROM REPRESENTING RESPONDENT ND DENYING SECOND MOTION FOR PPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent. (Docket no. 13)

Petitioner has filed a request to bar the Attorney General's Office from representing Respondent in this action based on an alleged "conflict of interest." He claims that the Attorney General's Office's "bad faith" resulted in the constitutional violations that form the basis of his habeas petition. However, Petitioner fails to support his conclusory assertions with any specific facts or relevant evidence. Thus, Petitioner's request to bar the Attorney General's Office from representing Respondent in this action is DENIED (docket no. 13).

Petitioner has also filed a second motion for appointment of counsel. Second, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply in habeas corpus actions. See Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 1986). Title 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B), however, authorizes a district court to appoint counsel to represent a habeas petitioner whenever "the court determines that the interests of justice so require" and such person is financially unable to obtain representation. The decision to appoint counsel is within the discretion of the district court. See Chaney v. Lewis, 801

F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986); <u>Knaubert</u> , 791 F.2d at 728; <u>Bashor v. Risley</u> , 730 F.2d 1228, 1234
(9th Cir. 1984). The courts have made appointment of counsel the exception rather than the rule by
limiting it to: (1) capital cases; (2) cases that turn on substantial and complex procedural, legal or
mixed legal and factual questions; (3) cases involving uneducated or mentally or physically impaired
petitioners; (4) cases likely to require the assistance of experts either in framing or in trying the
claims; (5) cases in which petitioner is in no position to investigate crucial facts; and (6) factually
complex cases. See generally 1 J. Liebman & R. Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and
Procedure § 12.3b at 383-86 (2d ed. 1994). Appointment is mandatory only when the circumstances
of a particular case indicate that appointed counsel is necessary to prevent due process violations.
See Chaney, 801 F.2d at 1196; Eskridge v. Rhay, 345 F.2d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 1965). At this time,
the Court is unable to determine whether the appointment of counsel is mandated for Petitioner.
Accordingly, the interests of justice do not require appointment of counsel, and Petitioner's second
request is DENIED (docket no. 13). This denial is without prejudice to the Court's <u>sua sponte</u>
reconsideration should the Court find an evidentiary hearing necessary following consideration of
the merits of Petitioner's claims.
This Order terminates Deaket no. 13

This Order terminates Docket no. 13.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: <u>12/12/11</u>

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

28